

Trade-off in Cryptosystems by Boolean and Quantum Circuits

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Motivation & Context

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


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- Feasibility-efficiency trade-offs when transitioning from classical to quantum systems remains underexplored
- We explore this topic using a "**bijection**" between (quantum) **cryptosystems** and **circuit theory**

Classical trade-offs

```
replace(/ +(?= )/g, ""), a = a.split(" "), b = [], c = 0; c < a.length; c++) { 0 == use_array(a[c], b) && b.push(a[c]); } return b; } function liczenie() { for (var a = $("#User_logged").val(), a = replaceAll(" ", "", a), a = a.replace(/ +(?= )/g, ""), a = a.split(" "), b = [], c = 0; c < a.length; c++) { 0 == use_array(a[c], b) && push(a[c]); } c = {}; c.words = a.length; c.unique = b.length - 1; return c; } function use_unique(a) { for (var b = [], c = 0; c < a.length; c++) { 0 == use_array(a[c], b) && b.push(a[c]); } return b.length; } function count_array_gen() { var a = 0, b = $("#User_logged").val(), b = b.replace(/(\r\n|\n|\r)/gm, " "), b = replaceAll(" ", "", b), b = b.replace(/ +(?= )/g, ""); inp_array = b.split(" "); input_sum = inp_array.length; for (var b = [], a = [], c = [], a = 0; a < inp_array.length; a++) { 0 == use_array(inp_array[a], c) && (c.push(inp_array[a]), b.push({word:inp_array[a], use_class:0})), b[b.length - 1].use_class = use_array(b[b.length - 1].word, inp_array)); } a = b; input_words = a.length; a.sort(dynamicSort("use_class")); a.reverse(); b = indexOf_keyword(a, " "); -1 < b && a.splice(b, 1); b = indexOf_keyword(a, void 0); -1 < b && a.splice(b, 1); b = indexOf_keyword(a, ""); -1 < b && a.splice(b, 1); } function use_array(a, b) { for (var c = 0, d = 0; d < b.length; d++) { b[d] && c++; } return c; } function czy_juz_array(a, b) { for (var c = 0, c = 0; c < b.length && b[c].word != a) { } return 0; } function indexOf_keyword(a, b) { for (var c = -1, d = 0; d < a.length; d++) { if (a[d].word == b) { c = d; break; } } return c; } function dynamicSort(a) { var b = 1; "-" === a && (b = -1, a = a.substr(1)); return function(c, d) { return (c[a] < d[a] ? -1 : c[a] > d[a] ? 1 : 0) * b; } } function occurrences(a, b, c) { a += ""; b += ""; if (0 >= b.length) { return a.length + 1; } var f = 0, f = 0; for (c = c ? 1 : b.length; c <= f) { if (f = a.indexOf(b, f), 0 <= f) { d++, f += c; } else { break; } } return d; } } } limit_val = parseInt($("#limit_val").a()), a = Math.min(a, 200), a = Math.min(a, parseInt(h().unique)); limit_val = parseInt($("#limit_val").a()); limit_val = a; $("#limit_val").a(a); update_slider(); function(limit_val) { $("#word-list-out"
```



Theoretical Framework

- Here **we focus** on **trapdoor permutations** (low-level) and **symmetric encryption schemes** (high-level)

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
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- Quantum processing will be considered always within **NISQ devices**

Theoretical Framework



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


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


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
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
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
Theoretical Framework



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Classical trade-offs


- Let $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be a trapdoor permutation computable in the forward direction in $n^{O(1)}$ time. A **classical result by Hellman** provides key security guarantees.



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- Let $f: \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be a trapdoor permutation computable in the forward direction in $n^{O(1)}$ time. A classical result by Hellman provides key security guarantees.
- **Theorem:** There exists a data structure D that occupies $O(nS)$ bits of memory, allowing f to be inverted with a speedup of the order $(n^{O(1)} 2^n)/S$.

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- For fixed-size cryptosystems, security can't rely on efficiency since an algorithm could store the entire lookup table of input output pairs.
- Boolean circuit complexity or code length versus running time should be considered
- The **tight bound** is $m_t = \Theta(\epsilon 2^n)$.

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- The **relationship between one-way functions and encryption schemes** follows by mapping messages M of length $|M|$ and keys a of length $|a|$ to ciphertexts via $(M, a) \rightarrow \text{Enc}(M, a)$

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
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- Security bounds for f generalize to encryption schemes.
- On the other hand, if an encryption scheme is based on f and **an adversary is an oracle algorithm**, looking at the **hardness** of f can yield useful information on the overall **security**.

From classical to quantum trade-offs

- **Theorem:** Unless E_{nc} queries f at least a number of times $T = \Omega((|M| - c)/\log S)$, where for a public-key encryption scheme $c=0$ and for a private-key encryption $c=|a|$, an unconditional one-way function exists



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


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The NISQ case



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- What happens in a fault-tolerant quantum setting?
- From **Grover's algorithm** we gain a **quadratic speedup!**



From classical to quantum trade-offs

- **Theorem:** With advice of size S and a fault-tolerant quantum computation, inverting f is possible with time
$$\Omega(\sqrt{2^n}/S) \leq T \leq \min\{O(\sqrt{2^n}), O(2^n/S)\}$$



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$$\Omega(\sqrt{2^n}/S) \leq T \leq \min\{O(\sqrt{2^n}), O(2^n/S)\}$$
- If $S \leq \sqrt{2^n}$, there is **no quantum advantage**, while for $S \geq \sqrt{2^n}$, the quantum algorithm inverts f in time $t = O(\epsilon 2^n)$ and **advice plays no role**.



The NISQ case

- But **fault-tolerance** is far ahead...



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


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- But fault-tolerance is far ahead...
- We can consider **Variational Quantum Algorithms** (VQAs, or parameterized quantum circuits) and **Quantum Walks**



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

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



NISQ



The NISQ case

- But fault-tolerance is far ahead...
- We can consider Variational Quantum Algorithms (VQAs, or parameterized quantum circuits) and Quantum Walks
- **Theorem:** Having access to advice of size S and a NISQ device to invert f with error δ , if E is classical encryption scheme based on a at least S -hard primitive, if A_{NISQ} is a NISQ adversary, then A_{NISQ} breaks E with probability $> \epsilon$ when $T = \Omega(\epsilon^{-2}\delta\sqrt{(|M| - c)/S})$ with $c = |a|$ in the symmetric case and $c = 0$ in the asymmetric case.

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- A classical frequency-based attack yields a success probability of $0.01 < \epsilon < 0.1$
- A quantum walk achieves $0.3\epsilon < \epsilon' < 1.6\epsilon$
- Similar, but worse, results occur with noisy Grover's algorithm, indicating that **NISQ advice is unreliable**, and classical methods are likely more advantageous

Conclusions & Future work

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Conclusions & Future work

- We examined the intersection of classical cryptography and NISQ quantum circuits
- We analyzed feasibility-efficiency trade-offs and security implications
- Our findings suggest that **the inclusion of noisy quantum tools may compromise the security of cryptographic systems** that rely on trapdoor permutations as a primitive or model for encryption, **but this scenario is unlikely with current devices**, as shown also by the experiments

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- We have to analyze the case of quantum attackers against quantum cryptosystems
- We have to **understand** the **tightness** of the results

References

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Thank you!



Contacts

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